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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TERRAN V. SECRETARY OF 

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: MODIFICATION 

OF STATUTES AND THE PRESENTMENT 

CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 

INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, Congress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine In­
jury Act! (the "Vaccine Act") as a means for "compensating indi­
viduals ... injured by vaccines routinely administered to children."2 
The Vaccine Act contains a Vaccine Injury Table3 ("Initial Injury 
Table"), which lists common vaccines, complications normally aris­
ing from such vaccines, and time periods within which these compli­
cations typically arise.4 Section 300aa-14(c) also authorizes the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") to periodi­
cally review the Initial Injury Table and amend it5 to conform to 
current scientific data concerning the complications that typically 
arise from vaccine administration.6 The Secretary did, in fact, 
amend the Initial Injury Table in 1995,7 by deleting residual seizure 
disorder8 as an injury associated with the DTP vaccine9 and narrow­
1. 42 U.S.c. §§ 300aa-l to -34 (1994). 
2. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344. 
3. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(a) (1994). 
4. For example, the Initial Injury Table lists anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock as 
a possible injury associated with the inactivated polio vaccine, with a time period of 24 
hours for the first symptom or manifestation of onset of this injury. Id. 
5. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c)(1994). 
6. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, § 2114, at 19 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6344, 6360-61. 
7. Thereby creating a Revised Vaccine Injury Table ("Revised Injury Table"). 
8. The Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation subsection of the Vaccine Act, 
section 300aa-14(b)(2), provides: 
A petitioner may be considered to have suffered a residual seizure disorder if 
the petitioner did not suffer a seizure or convulsion unaccompanied by fever 
or accompanied by a fever of less than 102 degrees Fahrenheit before the first 
seizure or convulsion after the administration of the vaccine involved and if ­
(A) in the case of a measles, mumps, or rubella vaccine or any combination of 
such vaccines, the first seizure or convulsion occurred within 15 days after ad­
ministration of the vaccine and 2 or more seizures or convulsions occurred 
within 1 year after the administration of the vaccine which were unaccompa­
nied by fever or accompanied by a fever of less than 102 degrees Fahrenheit, 
and (B) in the case of any other vaccine, the first seizure or convulsion oc­
curred within 3 days after the administration of the vaccine and 2 or more 
177 
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ing the definition of encephalopathy.lO 
Approximately four months after the 1995 enactment of the 
Revised Injury Table, Michelle Terran (on behalf of minor- Julie F. 
Terran) filed a petition for compensation under the Vaccine Act in 
the United States Court of Federal Claims.ll Her petition was de­
nied on the basis of the Secretary's 1995 revisions to the Initial In­
jury TableP Terran subsequently brought suit to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Vaccine Act,13 specifically the section of the 
act that authorizes the Secretary to amend the Initial Injury Table, 
under the theory that this authorization violates the Presentment 
. Clause of the Constitution.14 The Court of Federal Claims denied 
seizures or convulsions occurred within 1 year after the administration of the 
vaccine which were unaccompanied by fever or accompanied by a fever of less 
than 102 degrees Fahrenheit. 
42 U.S.c. §300aa-14(b) (2001). 
9. The DTP vaccine contains vaccines for diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis. Id. 
§ 300aa-14(a). 
10. Compare § 300aa-14(b)(3)(A) (defining encephalopathy as "any significant 
acquired abnormality of, or injury to, or impairment of function of the brain. Among 
the frequent manifestations encephalopathy are focal and diffuse neurological signs, 
increased intracranial pressure, or changes lasting at least 6 hours in level of conscious­
ness, with or without convulsions ...") with 42 c.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000) which states: 
An acute encephalopathy is one that is sufficiently severe so as to require 
hospitalization .... (A) For children less than 18 months of age who present 
without an associated seizure event, an acute encephalopathy is indicated by a 
significantly decreased level of consciousness lasting for at least 24 hours. 
Those children less than 18 months of age who present .following a seizure 
shall be viewed as having an acute encephalopathy if their significantly de­
. creased level of consciousness persists beyond 24 hours and cannot be attrib­
uted to a postictal state (seizure) or medication .... (C) Increased intracranial 
pressure may be a clinical feature of acute encephalopathy in any age 
group .... (D) A !'significantly decreased level of consciousness" is indicated 
. by the presence of at least one of the following clinical signs for at least 	24 
hours or greater ... : (1) Decreased or absent response to environment (re­
sponds, if at all, only to loud voice or painful stimuli); (2) Decreased or absent 
eye contact (does not fix gaze upon family members or other individuals); or 
(3) Inconsistent or absent responses to external stimuli (does not recognize 
familiar people or things). 
Id. 
11. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 95-451V, 1998 WL 55290, at 
*1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 23, 1998). The Vaccine Act states that "[t]he United States Court of 
Federal Claims and the United States Court of Federal Claims special masters shall ... 
have jurisdiction over proceedings to determine if a petitioner ... is entitled to compen­
sation under the [Vaccine Act] and the amount of such compensation." 42 U.S.c. 
§ 300aa-12(a) (2001). 
12. Terran, 1998 WL 55290, at *6. 
13. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 41 Fed. Cl. 330 (1998), atfd, 195 
F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). 
14. Id. at 334; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have 
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Terran's challenge,15 and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir­
cuit affirmed.16 
Terran is the seminal case raising the issue of whether the sec­
tion of the Vaccine Act that authorizes the Secretary to amend the 
Initial Injury Table violates the Presentment Clause of the Constitu­
tion.17 Part I of this note examines both the history of the Vaccine 
Act and the jurisprudential history of the Presentment Clause. Part 
II of this note discusses the specific circumstances under which Ter­
ran filed this challenge. It also contains an analysis of the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Terran, comparing these opinions with 
prior Presentment Clause case law. Part III of this note analyzes 
the issue involved and, in particular, examines whether the Terran 
court's constitutional interpretation was accurate in light of separa­
tion of powers principles and the nondelegation doctrine. This note 
concludes by noting that section 300aa-14(c) of the Vaccine Act 
may be an unconstitutional attempt to authorize a member of the 
executive branch to exercise strictly legislative power. Finally, it of­
fers a congressional alternative. 
I. LEGISLATIVE AND CASE-SPECIFIC HISTORY 
A. Promulgation of the Vaccine Act 
Traditionally, the federal government has had the responsibil­
ity of preventing the spread of infectious diseases from within and 
without the country's borders.18 Vaccination of children against 
deadly and disabling, but preventable, infections has been one of 
the most effective public health initiatives this country has ever un­
dertaken.19 The government's assumption of this role has saved bil­
lions of medical and health related dollars, and millions of children 
have grown up without the debilitating effects that have taken their 
toll on previous generations.20 Today, through federal support, 
passed the House of Representatives'and the Senate, shall, before it become[s] a Law, 
be presented to the President of the United States .... "). 
15. Terran, 41 Fed. Cl. at 338. 
16. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812(2000). 
17. See also O'Connell v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 40 Fed. Cl. 891, affd, 
217 F.3d 857 (Fed. CiT. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). The same court of 
appeals decided O'Connell five days after Terran. [d. The judges aligned exactly as 
they did in Terran and issued their majority and dissenting opinions only by reference 
to Terran. [d. 
18. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6346. 
19. [d. at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345. 
20. [d. at 4-5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344-46. 
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state and local health agencies are able to immunize children 
against polio, measles, mumps, rubella, diphtheria, pertussis, and 
tetanus21 with scientific study underway to prevent other types of 
disease. 
However, the nation's ability to maintain this level of success 
has recently been questioned as previously unknown injuries associ­
ated with these vaccines have surfaced.22 The number of children 
injured by vaccines each year is relatively sma1l23 compared with 
the number who are not, but serious consequences have resulted 
from the DTp24 and other vaccines.25 For the relatively few injured 
children, there was little opportunity for restitution since tort liabil­
ity principles often left many victims uncompensated. High transac­
tion costs, including attorney's fees and court payments made 
litigation unattractive, and lawsuit and settlement negotiations 
would take months and even years to complete.26 
Tort litigation has also been costly for vaccine manufacturers. 
The growing number of lawsuits caused an increase in liability in­
surance, making it impossible in some cases for manufacturers to 
obtain insurance.27 Due to this cost impediment, several vaccine 
manufacturers have withdrawn from the market,2s increasing the 
price of vaccines dramatically.29 
The multitude of uncompensated injuries, coupled with the in­
21. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6346. 
22. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4, 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 
6345-46. 
23. See NEIL Z. MILLER, IMMUNIZATION THEORY VS. REALITY: ExpOSE ON VAC­
CINATIONS 41-42, 96-98 (1996) (stating that every year, approximately 12,000 reports of 
adverse reactions are made to the Food and Drug Administration-including hospital­
izations, irreversible brain damage, and death-and, that because upwards of ninety 
percent of doctors do not report vaccine reactions, this number may be closer to 
120,000). 
24. DPT is a series of immunizations for diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus. See 
H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6347. Known compli­
cations and injuries arising from the DTP vaccine include anaphylaxis, anaphylactic 
shock, shock-collapse or hypotonic-hyporesponsive collapse, residual seizure disorder, 
and encephalopathy. See 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(a) (1994). 
25. H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6347. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See Press Release, American Academy of Pediatrics Washington Office, Vac­
cine Injury Compensation Program: Helping Children and Families (Sept. 28, 1999), 
available at http://www.aap.orgladvocacy/washinglvacinjcomp.htm (stating that before 
the introduction of the Vaccine Act, many vaccine manufacturers stopped producing 
certain vaccines due to potential liability issues and, "[a]s a result, vaccine supplies 
dwindled, endangering the health and safety of the nation's children"). 
29. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6345. 
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creasing price of vaccines, prompted Congress to act.30 In 1986, 
Congress passed the Vaccine Act as a means of compensating vic­
tims of vaccine-related injuries,31 and prioritizing vaccine safety and 
32progress. The Act provides compensation for victims of vaccine­
related injuries33 while allowing the victims, at their option, to re­
ject the compensation and proceed to trial.34 
As a means of clarifying and expediting claims of vaccine inju­
ries, Congress included the Initial Injury Table.35 Following the Ini­
30. Congress' findings were as follows: 
1. The availability and use of vaccines to prevent childhood diseases is among 
the Nation's top public health priorities. 
2. The Federal government has the responsibility to ensure that all children in 
need of immunization have access to them and to ensure that all children who 
are injured by vaccines have access to sufficient compensation for their 
injuries. 
3. Private or non-governmental activities have proven inadequate in achieving 
either of these goals. 
4. Current economic conditions have resulted in an unstable and unpredictable 
childhood vaccine market, making the threat of vaccine shortages a real 
possibility. 
5. Because of their cost-effectiveness, the Federal government has an interest 
in the development, distribution, and use of vaccines, including those designed 
to prevent non-childhood diseases. 
Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.CC.AN. 6344, 6346. 
31. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.CCAN. 6344, 6344. Since the Vaccine Act's 
promulgation, over 5000 claims for compensation have been received, eighty-five per­
cent of which are for vaccines administered prior to the Vaccine Act's effective date of 
October 1, 1988. See HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
ON VICP, available at http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/vicp/abdvic.htm [hereinafter HRSA). 
32. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 3-4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.CCAN. 6344, 6344­
45; see also HRSA, supra note 31 (stating that suits against DTP vaccine manufacturers 
have decreased dramatically since the promulgation of the Vaccine Act, from 255 suits 
being filed in 1986 to four suits in 1997). 
33. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 46-47 (stating that by August 31, 1997, more 
than $302 million had already been paid out under the compensation component of the 
Vaccine Act, that thousands of cases are still pending, and that future liability for pre­
1988 vaccine injuries could exceed $1.7 billion). 
34. 42 U.S.C § 300aa-21(a) (2001). The process for obtaining compensation 
under the Vaccine Act requires that a person with an injury resulting from a vaccine 
that was administered after enactment of the Vaccine Act must file a compensation 
petition and go through the compensation program before proceeding with any litiga­
tion against the vaccine manufacturer. If the victims, after compensation proceedings 
are complete, are dissatisfied with the award, they may reject the proceeding's findings 
and seek compensation through the courts. H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 17, reprinted in 
1986 U.S.CCAN. 6344, 6358. Vaccine Act data shows that only a small percentage of 
victims reject the award. See HRSA, supra note 31 (stating that out of 3142 vaccine 
injury claims adjudicated through 1995, only seventy claimants have filed motions to 
reject the award). 
35. The claimant need not have an injury that falls under this Table. The Vaccine 
Act provides two ways for claimants to receive compensation: first, by showing they 
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tial Injury Table is a list of Qualifications and Aids in 
Interpretation36 (QAIs) that provide explanations of and defini­
tions for the terms within the Table. Because Congress also real­
ized that this Initial Injury Table and the QAIs were going to prove 
incomplete as new scientific data was developed, Congress included 
. a clause that allows the Secretary to revise the Initial Injury Table 
and QAIs.37 This section also allows for revision recommendations 
to be made by the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines or 
any other person.38 . Unless clearly frivolous, these recommenda­
tions are submitted to the Secretary for review, and the Secretary is 
required either to conduct it rulemaking proceeding or to publish 
reasons for not conducting such a proceeding.39 Any modifications 
made to the Initial Injury Table or QAIs apply only to petitions 
filed for compensation after the modification is made.40 
In 1995, the Secretary modified the Initial Injury Table and 
QAIs.41 Two of the changes made by the Secretary in the 1995 revi­
sion were the elinlination of Residual Seizure Disorder (RSD) from 
the Initial Injury Table and a change in the definition for en­
cephalopathy.42 These regulations went into effect on March 10, 
1995,43 and Terran filed her claim on July 12, 1995.44 
suffered a "table injury" (an injury listed on the Injury Table) or by proving causation in 
fact (thereby not precluding traditional tort remedies). 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-ll(a) (2001). 
36. Id. § 300aa-14(b).· . 
37. [d.; H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,6364. 
38. H.R. Rep. No. 99-908, at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6364. 
39. [d. ' . 
40. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c) (1994). The statute reads: 
(1) The Secretary may promulgate regulations to modify in accordance with 
paragraph (3) the Vaccine Injury Table .... 
(2) Any person (including the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines) 
may petition the Secretary to propose regulations to amend the Vaccine Injury 
Table .... 
(3) A modification of the Vaccine Injury Table under paragraph (1) may add 
to, or delete from, the list of injuries, disabilities, illnesses, conditions, and 
deaths for which compensation may be provided or may change the time peri­
ods for the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of the significant aggra­
vation of any such injury, disability, illness, condition, or death. 
(4) Any modification under paragraph (1) of the Vaccine Injury Table shall 
apply only with respect to petitions for compensation under the Program, 
which are filed after the effective date of such regulation. 
[d. 
41. 42 c.P.R. §100.3 (1995). These modifications are at the heart of the issue to 
be discussed in Part II of this note. 
42. Compare 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(a)-(b) (1994), with 42 C.F.R § 100.3 (1996). 
43. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 P.3d 1302, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). 
44. [d. 
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B. The Presentment Clause 
In 1787, fifty-five delegates from eleven states met in Philadel., 
phia.45 Among those present were the nation's most prominent 
leaders and statesmen, including George Washington, who was 
elected president of the convention, James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin.46 These delegates assembled to 
remedy problems with the existing Articles of Confederation but 
opted instead to create an entirely new Constitution.47 
The ensuing adoption of the Constitution resulted in a division 
of the United States federal government into three separate but in­
terdependent branches-the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches.48 The Framers of the Constitution chose to divide the 
government because of a fundamental fear of an overly strong cen­
tral government, to safeguard against tyranny, and to promote effi­
ciency.49 By separating the powers of the federal government, the 
Framers put "checks and balances" on each branch of the govern­
menpo The President has the power to veto any law that Congress 
passes; Congress may, in turn, override the veto by a two-thirds ma­
jority vote in both houses.51 Finally, judicial branch review ensures 
that all laws passed are constitutiona1.52 
One incarnation of the principle of separation of powers is the 
Presentment Clause53 of the Constitution. The Presentment Clause 
requires that every bill passed by Congress be presented to the 
President.54 The President either signs the bill or returns it to Con­
gress.55 The Presentment Clause further states that if the President 
returns the bill, Congress can override the veto with a two-thirds 
majority vote in both the Senate and House of Representatives.56 
45. Lance Banning, The Constitutional Convention, in THE FRAMING AND RATI­
FICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 112 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 
1987). 
46. Id. at 112, 120, 131. 
47. Id. at 113. 
48. Ralph A. Rossum, The Courts and Judicial Power, in THE FRAMING AND 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 229. 
49. GERARD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 354 
(13th ed. 1997). 
50. Id. 
51. Judith A. Best, The Presidency and the Executive Power, in THE FRAMING 
AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 217. 
52. Id. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. (returning the bill is commonly referred to as a Presidential Veto). 
56. Id. 
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The presidential veto power gives the President an important de­
fensive weapon against legislative intrusions on the power of the 
Executive.57 Concern over precisely this instrusion was noted by 
the Founding Fathers.58 
A recent Supreme Court decision interpreting the Presentment 
Clause and discussing the separation of powers principle is INS v. 
Chadha,59 which found that a provision of the Immigration and Na­
tionality Act of 1952 violated the Presentment Clause.6o In 
Chadha, the Supreme Court examined the history of the Present­
ment Clause and noted that requiring all legislation to be presented 
to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by all 
of the Framers of the Constitution.61 The Court stated, "[i]t 
emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in article 
I, sections one and seven represents the Framers' decision that the 
legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord 
with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, proce­
dure."62 The Court then noted that not every action taken by the 
House is subject to the Presentment Clause.63 Only those actions 
that are properly regarded as legislative in character and effect are 
subject to it.64 The Court found that because article I, section 8, 
clause 4 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to establish a uni­
form Rule of Naturalization, any action the House took in regard to 
naturalization procedures is a legislative act and subject to the Pre­
sentment Clause.65 The Court found· that the section of the Immi­
gration Act allowing the House to veto, without presentment to the 
57. Consumer Energy Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 
461 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("In republican government, 
the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is 
to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, ... as little con­
nected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common 
dependence on the society will admit."). 
59. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chadha was foreign-born and entered the United States 
on a non-immigrant visa which subsequently expired. An immigration judge, acting on 
the authority of the Attorney General, suspended Chadha's deportation. The Immigra­
tion and Nationality Act provides that if the Senate or House passes a resolution 
against suspension, the Attorney General must deport the alien. The House did pass a 
resolution opposing Chadha's deportation suspension, and Chadha was deported. Id. at 
923-28. 
60. Id. at 946. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 951. 
63. Id. at 952. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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Presidept, the Attorn~y General's decision to allow an alien to re­
main in the country violated the explicit procedures set forth in the 
Constitution and was, therefore, unconstitutiona1.66 
The decision in Chadha and the intent of the Framers as evi­
denced by the Federalist Papers both show that the purpose of the 
Presentment Clause was to establish a method of checking the 
power of the legislative branch.67 This was done so that the legisla­
tive branch would not become the. solitary source of federal 
power.68 
II. THE PRINCIPAL CASE 
A. Terran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services: 
Background 
Julie F. Terran was born in apparently good health on February 
10, 1992, in Phoenix, Arizona.69 Her score on the Apgar70 test was 
an eight/nine out of ten when she was discharged from the hospital 
on February 11, 1992. Julie received her first DPT vaccine on 
March 27,1992, her second on June 3, 1992, her third on August 10, 
1992, and her fourth (an acellular DPT vaccine) on September 22, 
1993.71 The August vaccine, Julie's third, was the only one at issue 
in the present case.72 
On August 11,1992, Julie suffered a seizure that lasted approx­
imately seven seconds and caused one·of her arms to become stiff.73 
.on August 12, Julie experienced four more afebrile seizures, each 
lasting roughly one minute. Julie was immediately rushed by ambu­
lance to Phoenix's Children's Hospital at the Good Samaritan Med­
ical Center. Along the way, paramedics observed Julie to be alert 
66. Id. at 957-58 (fmding unconstitutionality because, by not presenting their ac­
tion to the President for approval, the House had taken legislative action without fol­
lowing the steps outlined in the Presentment Clause). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 41 Fed. Cl. 330, 331-32 (1998), 
affd, 195 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). 
70. Id. The Apgar test, named for Dr. Virginia Apgar, measures physical traits of 
infants, such as heartbeat, respiratory effort, and muscle tone. As newborns are unable 
to communicate that something hurts or does not feel right, the test is a means to deter­
mine the health of the child. The best Apgar score is a ten. [d. at 332 n.2. 
71. Id. at 332. 
72. Prior to the third vaccine, Julie had a meningocele lump removed from her 
skull, but tests, also completed before the third vaccine, indicated that she had no brain 
abnormalities. On May 18, 1992, an MRI scan reported her brain structure as normal 
and a biopsy concluded that the removed lump was not cancerous. Id. 
73. Id .. 
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and active; in fact, she was playing with her oxygen mask. The hos­
pital admitted Julie and she remained there for observation until 
August 14, 1992. 
On August 13, 1992, while at the hospital, Julie experienced a 
seizure that lasted for five and one-half minutes. The hospital pre­
scribed Phenobarbital,74 but the seizures continued throughout the 
next year. On September 12, 1992, Julie suffered a seizure that 
lasted almost fifty minutes despite her being on Phenobarbital at 
the time. Julie's seizures were continuing as of the date of trial. In 
addition, she suffers from mental retardation.75 
On July 12, 1995, Michelle Terran filed a petition for compen­
sation under the Vaccine Act on behalf of minor Julie Terran.76 The 
Special Master for the United States Court of Federal Claims de­
nied compensation under the Vaccine Act.77 On appeal to the 
United States Court of Federal Claims, it was alleged that Julie suf­
fers from RSD and encephalopathy as defined prior to the 1995 
modification of the Initial Injury Table.78 The court recognized that 
Julie would have been able to recover had she brought her petition 
prior to the modification, but decided that under the current Re­
vised Injury Table, Julie could not recover under the Vaccine Act.79 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, Julie con­
tended that the Vaccine Act was not constitutionally valid since it 
permitted the Secretary to modify portions of a statute in violation 
of the Presentment Clause of the Constitution.80 The court denied 
Julie's appeal, despite a strong dissent.81 
B. The Majority Opinion 
Terran's constitutional challenge to the Vaccine Act alleged 
that section 300aa-14(c) of the Act, which authorizes the Secretary 
to alter the Initial Injury Table,82 violated the Presentment Clause 
74. Phenobarbital is an anti-convulsant. Id. 
75. Id.; see also 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(b) (1994) (stating that encephalopathy may 
result in various degrees of permanent impairment.) 
76. Terran, 41 Fed. CI. at 332. 
77. Id. For the jurisdiction mandated by the Vaccine Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa­
12 (2001). 
78. Terran, 41 Fed. CI. at 334. 
79. Id. at 335. 
80. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2. 
81. See Terran, 195 F.3d at 1302. 
82. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c)(1) (1994). 
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of the Constitution.83 By allowing the Secretary, in effect, to amend 
and repeal portions of a statute, the plaintiff argued, Congress had 
bypassed the presentment conditions required of legislative acts by 
the Presentment Clause.84 
In response to that claim, the Court of Appeals acknowledged 
that the Constitution does not allow members of the executive 
branch to enact,85 amend,86 or repeal87 statutes. Such power is 
vested exclusively in Congress and the exercise of such legislative 
power must follow the procedures set forth in the Constitution.88 
The court looked at the Secretary's' actions not as an amendment of 
a statute, but as the promulgation of an administrative ruly89 en­
tirely in the discretion of the executivel?ranch.90 
The court first stated that the Vaccine Act does not explicitly 
allow the Secretary to amend the Initial Injury Table because the 
Initial Injury Table is still on the books and. continues to apply to all 
petitions filed prior to the existence of the 1995 Revised Injury Ta­
ble.91 The court looked instead at the section in question92 as au­
thorizing the Secretary to promulgate an entirely new Vaccine 
Injury Table that applies only prospectively.93 
The court stated that Congress enacted the Initial Injury Table 
knowing that the Table contained ·flaws.94 It was Congress' intent 
that the Secretary should commission studies on the links between 
vaccines and injuries, create a panel to oversee the collection of 
data on vaccine-related injuries, and revise the Initial Injury Table 
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
84. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312. 
85. "Enact" is defined as "to establish by law; to perform or effect; to decree." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990). 
86. "Amend" is defined as "to improve; to change for the better by removing 
defects or faults; to change, correct, revise." Id. at 80. 
87. "Repeal" is defined as "the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing 
law by the enactment of a subsequent statute Which declares that the former law shall 
be revoked or abrogated or which contains provisions so contrary to or irreconcilable 
with those of the earlier law that.only one of the two statutes can stand in force." Id. at 
1299. 
88. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312. 
89. Administrative rulemaking is, by definition, not a legislative act, but rather an 
exercise of executive function properly entrusted to administrative agencies. See Am. 
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 310-13 (1953). 
90. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312. 
91. Id. 
92. 42 U.s.c. § 300aa-14(c)(I) (1994). 
93. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312. 
94. Id. at 1313. 
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based on the information obtained from such studies.95 "Congress 
clearly intended the Initial Table would cease to apply to newly 
filed petitions when the Secretary promulgated a revised injury ta­
ble."96 Therefore, the court reasoned, because the Initial Injury Ta­
ble becomes ineffective (not non-existent) upon the Secretary's 
promulgation of a revised table, the statutory scheme does not vio­
late the intentions of the Presentment Clause.97 
The court found support for its reasoning in Field v. Clark.98 
The court analogized its current decision to Field, decided over a 
century before, by reasoning that Congress had anticipated that the 
scientific data linking vaccines and injuries may change in the future 
and had intended that the Secretary act when more accurate data 
became available.99 
The reasoning in Field is echoed in the majority's holding in 
Terran. In the majority's view of Field, the President's power to 
suspend the provisions of the Tariff Act was contingent on condi­
tions that did not exist at the time the law was passed. lOO Likewise, 
the Terran court held that the Secretary's power to modify the Ini­
tial Injury Table was also contingent on scientific data not known or 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. 143 u.S. 649 (1892). The Field case involved Congress' enactment of the 
Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 (hereinafter "Tariff Act"), which authorized the President 
of the United States to suspend, "for such time as he shall deem just," free importation 
under the Tariff Act from any country or countries that impose unfair tariffs on U.S. 
exports. 
Challengers sought to show that this part of the Tariff Act, in so far as it authorized 
the President to suspend provisions of the Act, is unconstitutional as it delegates legisla­
tive power to the Executive and violates the Presentment Clause. Their challenge was 
rejected. The Supreme Court noted that the concept that Congress cannot delegate 
legislative power to the President is a "principle universally recognized as vital to the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." 
However, the Act does not invest the President with the power of legislation; rather, 
Congress itself determined that the free .introduction of imports to the United States 
should be suspended as to any country which the President believes to be unfairly plac­
ing tariffs on U.S. exports, and Congress determined duties to be levied on these prod­
ucts in the event of suspension. [d. at 692-93. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the Act 
required the President to periodically examine the commercial regulations of other 
countries producing and exporting these products and form a judgment as to whether 
they were reciprocally reasonable and fair. If a country was placing tariffs on U.S. 
exports unfairly, the President could issue a proclamation declaring a suspension on the 
free import of their goods. The President has no discretion on when to act, only as to 
how long the suspension would endure. Obedience to legislative will is not a legislative 
function reserved for Congress. [d. at 693. 
99. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1313. 
100. [d. 
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realized at the time the Vaccine Act was passed. Due to this, Con­
gress anticipated that the facts underlying its legislation (the scien­
tific data linking various injuries to vaccinations) might change in 
the future. 1OI 
Further, the Terran majority noted that in Field, the President 
had the discretion to determine when another· country was placing 
unfair tariffs on U.S. exports and to determine how long suspen­
sions would endure under the Tariff Act.102 The Terran majority 
explained that, under the Vaccine Act, the Secretary has similar dis­
cretion to promulgate a Revised Injury Table.103 To illustrate the 
shared narrow discretion, the court noted that the Vaccine Act re­
quires the Secretary to act when new scientific data comes to his 
attention or when a person petitions for a modification of the Initial 
Injury Table; similarly, the Tariff Act required the President to or­
der a suspension when he determined that another country was act­
ing unfairly.104 Concluding that the Field decision applied to the 
challenge in Terran, the majority found that the Vaccine Act was 
not in violation of the Presentment Clause.105 
Terran also raised Clinton v. City of New York lO6 in her chal­
lenge to the Vaccine Act, but the majority in Terran found the deci­
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 1314. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The Line Item Veto Act (hereinafter "Veto Act") gives 
the President the power to cancel certain discretionary spending provisions within five 
days of the bill being signed into law, subject to restrictions such as consideration of the 
legislative history, the purposes of the provision, and other relevant information about 
the provision. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691(e)(4)(B)-(C), (b) (Supp. II 1996). The Supreme Court 
found that the Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421. The 
Court recognized that there is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the Pres­
ident to enact, amend, or repeal statutes; he may influence and initiate legislative pro­
posals, but he may not modify existing laws. Id. at 438. The President must either sign 
or return a bill that has passed both Houses of Congress, according to the Presentment 
Clause. Id. The Court noted that there are important differences between the return of 
the bill pursuant to the Presentment Clause and the exercise of the President's cancella­
tion under the Veto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes 
a law, while the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill has become law. The Court 
then stated that "although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to playa 
role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presiden­
tial action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes." Therefore, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause by giving 
the President the power to repeal items of a statute. The President is, in effect, creating 
a new statute without having it pass through both Houses of Congress. Clinton, 524 
U.S. at 420-39. 
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sion in Clinton was inapplicable to the case before them.107 In 
Clinton, the Supreme Court held that the Line Item Veto Act was 
an unconstitutional violation of the Presentment Clause.108 The 
Terran majority agreed with the Clinton Court that the Constitution 
does not authorize the President to enact, amend, or repeal stat­
utes.109 The Terran majority noted key differences, however, be­
tween the facts and law raised in Clinton, those raised in Field, and 
those raised in the case before them. l1O 
Initially, the Terran court reiterated that in the Tariff Act in 
Field, and in the Vaccine Act, Congress had anticipated that the 
facts underlying its legislation might change in the future and had 
formulated the statute to accommodate those changes.111 In the 
Veto Act, at issue in Clinton, because there was only a five-day time 
period in which the President could exercise his power to cancel 
provisions in legislative enactments, any action the President took 
would have to be based on the same conditions contemplated by 
Congress.112 . 
Next, the Terran majority noted that the Veto Act provided 
little constraint on the President's discretion to cancel a portion of a 
statute.113 In Field, however, the Tariff Act had limited the Presi­
dent's discretion to declare a suspension.114 Accordingly, the Ter­
ran majority found the Vaccine Act to be more closely related to 
the Tariff Act than the Veto Act. l1S Although the Secretary has the 
ultimate discretion in revising the Initial Injury Table, the Vaccine 
Act requires not only that the Secretary respond to petitions by any 
persons, regarding the Initial Injury Table, but it also sets forth pro­
cedural requirements that govern any modification the Secretary 
may make, thereby somewhat limiting the Secretary's discretion.116 
Finally, the Terran majority noted that, in Field, it was pre­
sumed that the President was fulfilling congressional policy when 
he declared a suspension under the Tariff Act.117 In Clinton, how­
107. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1314. 
108. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448-49. 
109. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312. 
110. Id. 
111. For example, scientists could uncover new information regarding the rela­
tionships between various vaccines and injuries associated with them. Id. at 1313. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1314. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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ever, the President was clearly contravening congressional policy by 
canceling spending items Congress had just passed.118 The Terran 
majority found that the Vaccine Act more closely aligned with the 
Tariff Act, as it seemed to be Congressional policy that the Secre­
tary subsequently modifies the Initial Injury Table.119 Due to this 
fidelity to congressional intent, the Terran court held that the analy­
sis used in Field was more applicable than the analysis used in 
Clinton.120 
The majority concluded that under the Vaccine Act, the Secre­
tary does not have the power to alter or amend the Act itself. In­
stead, the Secretary only has the power to promulgate a revised 
table that is in accord with current scientific data. Thus, the Secre­
tary's action is not a violation of the Presentment Clause.121 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
The basis of Judge Plager's dissent was his strong disagreement 
with the majority's conclusion that the Vaccine Act did not grant 
the Secretary the ability to amend and repeal a statute in violation 
of the Presentment Clause.122 Judge Plager recognized that in or­
der for a bill to become a law it must first pass through both Houses 
of Congress and then be presented to the President of the United 
States for approval or veto. Neither House acting alone, nor the 
President or any other member of the executive branch, may consti­
tutionally enact, amend, or repeal statutes.123 By permitting the ex­
ecutive branch to make the amendment to the Injury Table, Judge 
Plager contended, Congress is providing for the amendment of oth­
erwise valid, enforceable, and existing legislation in a manner con­
trary to the intention of the Constitution.124 
Judge Plager drew on Clinton v. City ofNew York 125 when not­
ing that the Supreme Court has recognized and made clear that any 
amendment or modification of a statute must follow the exact pro­
cedures defined in the Presentment Clause.126 Judge Plager relied 
on the Clinton Court's analysis in his assertion that the Vaccine Act 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 1317 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
123. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
125. 524 U.S. 417 (1998); see supra note 106 (providing Clinton facts and 
holding). 
126. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1319 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
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does violate the Presentment Clause.127 Judge Plager found Clin­
ton applicable, not only because it was a Supreme Court decision 
decided only one year before, but also because the Court in Clinton 
had made it clear that any modification to a statute must follow the 
procedures set forth in the Presentment Clause.128 Judge Plager 
reasoned that the Supreme Court in Clinton had found that the 
President had legally and effectively amended an act of Congress by 
repealing a portion of it and that the cancellation of one section of a 
statute may be the equivalent of a partial repeal even if a portion of 
the section is not cancelled.129 Judge Plager determined that the 
Secretary was basically doing the same thing, amending an act of 
Congress by repealing a portion of it (the Initial Injury Table).130 
Judge Plager disagreed with the majority in Terran by reason­
ing that because the Vaccine Act gives the Secretary the unilateral 
power to modify an existing statute (the Initial Injury Table), it is in 
violation of the bicameralism and presentment guidelines set forth 
by the Presentment Clause.131 Judge Plager examined the major­
ity's contention that this is not a modification of an existing statute, 
but merely promulgation of a new regulation that only nullifies that 
existing statute.132 He concluded. that the majority's unstated pre­
mise was that an amendment that leaves an earlier provision unre­
pealed means that the earlier provision was not amended.133 He 
pointed out that in almost all cases where Congress changes an ex­
isting law, the provisions of the original statute still apply to cases 
arising prior to the effective date of the change.134 Therefore, 
Judge Plager reasoned, when Congress changes a statute, it does 
not amend it unless the provision it is changing is totally repealed 
with retroactivity.135 
Judge Plager stated that as a result of the Secretary's promul­
gation of the 1995 Revised Injury Table, the Initial Injury Table was 
no longer effective and that the Secretary had deleted a portion of a 
statute that would have been available to Julie Terran.136 There­
fore, the Secretary had amended a statute by repealing a portion of 
127. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
129. Id. at 1320 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
130. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
131. Id. at 1319 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
132. Id. at 1319-20 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. at 1320 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
134. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
2002]TERRAN: THE VACCINE ACT AND THE PRESENTMENT CLAUSE 193 
it, even if that portion was still on the books.137 The Vaccine Act 
gives the Secretary complete authority to modify the Initial Injury 
Table that was included within the statute, and, as a result, the Sec­
retary was modifying that statute without having to go through the 
steps required by the Presentment Clause.138 Judge Plager stated 
that he would have found the 1995 Revised Injury Table to be with­
out legal effect, thereby allowing Terran to recover.139 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Section 300aa-14(c), the Vaccine Act, authorizes the Secretary 
to issue a Revised Injury Table that renders the Initial Injury Table 
inapplicable to subsequent petitions filed under the Vaccine Act.140 
Whether or not the Secretary's power violates the Presentment 
Clause of the Constitution has faced little scrutiny in the courts. 
The Terran court, the only court to decide the issue, held that 
"[s]ection 300aa-14(c)of the Vaccine Act does not violate the Pre­
sentment Clause. "141 This analysis will examine both sides of the 
issue, to determine whether the Vaccine Act violates the Present­
ment Clause and to determine available solutions. The analysis be­
gins by distinguishing between functional and formalistic views of 
the separation of powers concept, as well as discussing the potential 
delegation of power issue involved in the Secretary's actions. This 
will be followed by application of these ideologies to the present 
issue and a determination of the correct outcome. In conclusion, 
there will be a brief discussion of constitutionally. permitted 
alternatives. 
A. Form Versus Function: In General 
The form versus function debate has been a long-standing tra­
dition throughout American jurisprudence. In its basic form, the 
question is whether courts ought to follow the exact, literal wording 
of a statute or manipulate a statute to accommodate a situation that 
perhaps the authors of the statute did not foresee? This debate is as 
prevalent when it comes to separation of powers as it is in any other 
field. Should courts respect a complete separation of power be­
tween the executive, legislative, and judicial branches? Or, should 
137. Id. at 1320-21 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
138. Id. at 1321 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. at 1308. 
141. Id. at 1314. 
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they allow the branches to commingle their powers to promote effi­
ciency in a modern United States that the Framers of the Constitu­
tion perhaps did not envision when promulgating this document? 
1. The Formalistic Approaches 
When the founders convened to create the Constitution, there 
was a fundamental fear of government. This fear presumably arose 
from the tyrannical control of Great Britain, from which they had 
recently fled, and led them to distribute the powers of the federal 
government among three branches with distinct duties and respon­
sibilities.142 Each branch, in addition to the exclusive powers and 
duties granted it, was given the power to "check" the other 
branches of the government.143 For example, if Congress passes an 
act, the President may sign it or veto it, thus creating an executive 
"check" over the legislative function.144 
A formalistic view of the separation. of powers concept re­
quires that courts examine the words of the Constitution to see if 
the text permits the challenged action. Under the formal view, a 
statute that allows a member of the executive branch to employ 
legislative power will be struck down because it violates the separa­
tion of powers principle. 
An example of the formal view is the position taken by the 
Supreme Court in Clinton,145 where the Court held the Line Item 
Veto Act unconstitutional as a violation of the Presentment 
Clause.146 A fundamental principle of separation of powers is 
found within the Presentment Clause, which requires that every act 
passed by Congress must be presented to the President before it 
will have the force of law.147 The majority in Clinton, led by Justice 
Stevens, adopted the formal approach in its opinion when it found 
that the Veto Act's grant of power to the President violated the 
express words of the Presentment Clause.148 In finding that the 
Veto Act authorized action in violation of the Presentment Clause, 
142. See DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND 
RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 58 (4th ed. 2000). 
143. Id. at 56. 
144. Id. at 91. 
145. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); see supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
146. Clinton, 524 U.S. at448. 
147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
148. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-40. "What has emerged in these cases from the Pres­
ident's exercise of his statutory cancellation powers [of the Veto Act], however, are 
truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the 
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Justice Stevens noted that the only options the President has with 
respect to an act passed by Congress and presented to him is to 
approve it or veto it.149 One year later, following the majority opin­
ion in Clinton, Judge Plager's dissent in Terran I50 utilized the for­
mal approach in urging that the Vaccine Act is also in violation of 
the text of the Presentment Clause.151 
The formalistic view of separation of powers has been applied 
in other situationsI52 and seems to be the trend of the Supreme 
Court after their decision in Clinton. In Terran, the dissenting opin­
ion utilized formalistic reasoning,153 but the majority decided the 
Presentment Clause. issue before them following a functional 
approach.154 
2. The Functionalist Approach 
The functional approach developed because of a perceived 
need to promote efficiency among the branches of the govern­
ment.155 In essence, this approach allows power reserved for one 
branch of the government to be exercised by a member of another 
branch.156 The underpinning for the modern functionalist approach 
was stated by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Clinton, where he 
noted that at the time the United States was founded and the Con­
stitution written, the population was less than four million, there 
were fewer than five thousand federal employees, and the annual 
budget totaled approximately four million dollars.157 In contrast, 
product of the 'finely wrought' procedure that the Framers designed." Id. (quoting INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)) (citation omitted). 
149. Id. at 440. 
1.50. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000) (Plager, J., dissenting). See discussion supra 
Part I.C; see also infra Part II1.B.3 (discussing Judge Plager's dissenting opinion in more 
detail). 
151. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1319-21 (Plager,J., dissenting). 
152. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 73­
74, 87 (1982) (striking down the 1978 revisions to the Bankruptcy Act, which allowed 
Article I bankruptcy judges to perform the same judicial functions as Article III judges, 
because the Constitution did not specifically grant jurisdiction to Article I bankruptcy 
judges to hear issues involving public rights). 
153. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1317-21 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
154. Id. at 1312-14. 
155. See id. at 1312 (stating that the Presentment Clause is inapplicable to admin­
istrative rulemaking, even though agencies are technically part of the administrative 
branch, because "rulemaking is by definition not a legislative act, but rather an act of 
executive function properly entrusted"). 
156. Id. at 1312; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 470 (1998) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
157. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 470 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Breyer continued, the current U.S. population is approxi-. 
mat ely two hundred and fifty million, there are over four million 
federal employees, and an annual budget of over one and a half 
trillion dollars.I58 Justice Breyer believed that, given this extreme 
change in circumstances coupled with the "Framers' pragmatic vi­
sion," the Constitution allows for "necessary institutional innova­
tion."159 Congress may use novel means to accomplish a 
constitutionally legitimate end, even if such means is the delegation 
of some of its power to another branch of the government.160 
The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."161 The 
Supreme Court, in interpreting this language, has derived the 
"nondelegation doctrine," which mandates that Congress may not 
delegate its legislative powers to any other branch of govern­
ment.162 The influence of functionalists within the Supreme Court 
has led it to the creation of exceptions to the nondelegation doc­
trine.163 Delegations are exempted from violating separation of 
powers principles so long as Congress "lay[s] down by legislative act 
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to 
[act] is directed to conform ...."164 Therefore, Congress may dele­
gate its legislative power so long as it requires the branch exercising 
the power to follow standards that can be labeled by the Court as 
"intelligible principles. "165 
Functionalists, therefore, have succeeded in implanting their 
approach into American jurisprudence, most notably by the excep­
tion to the nondelegation doctrine. Some authors believe this ap­
158. Id. at 471 (Breyer, I., dissenting). 
159. Id. at 472 (Breyer, I., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 472-73 (Breyer, I., dissenting). 
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
162. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("The nondeiegation doc­
trine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite sys­
tem of Government.") (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989». 
163. "The Constitution permits Congress to 'see[k] assistance from another 
branch' of Government, the 'extent and character' of that assistance to be fixed 'accord­
ing to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.'" 
See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 484 (Breyer, I., dissenting) (quoting I.W. Hampton, Ir. & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928». 
164. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 409. 
165. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,225-26 (1943) (up­
holding delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast 
licensing as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires); Fed. Powers Comm'n 
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600-03 (1944) (upholding delegation to the 
Federal Power Commission to determine "just and reasonable" rates). 
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proach to be both important and unavoidable.166 The division of 
courts in adopting the formal versus functional approach is on-go­
ing and is nowhere more apparent than in the Terran case. 
B. 	 Form versus Function: The Vaccine Act and the Presentment 
Clause 
The Vaccine Act at issue in Terran prompts the same questions 
as do most separation of powers issues: Does the Vaccine Act vio­
late the express language of the Constitution? Even if the Vaccine 
Act does violate such express language, is it possibly a constitution­
ally legitimate delegation of power? 
1. 	 The Vaccine Act Does Not Violate the Presentment 
Clause 
The majority in Terran stated that the main reason that the 
Vaccine Act does not violate the Presentment Clause is that when 
the Secretary promulgates the Revised Injury Table, the Initial In­
jury Table is not repealed, amended, or evert modified.167 The Ini­
tial Injury Table is still on the books and is still effective to petitions 
for relief that have been filed prior to the promulgation of the Re­
vised Injury Table.168 This reasoning may seem to be an issue of 
semantics, but it is how the Supreme Court has responded to Pre­
sentment Clause challenges in the past.169 
In the Field case, the Supreme Court found that, because the 
Tariff Act envisioned a change in circumstances and required the 
President to suspend free importation when another country began 
to tax U.S. exports unfairly, it did not violate the Presentment 
166. See Peter L. Strauss, Bowsher v. Synar: Formal and Functional Approaches 
to Separation·oJ-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 
(1987). 
[I]n 1987, [merger of function between the branches of the government] is 
unavoidable given Congress's need to delegate at some level the making of 
policy for a complex and interdependent economy .... Respect for [the] 
"framers' intent" is only workable in the context of the actual present, and 
may require some selectivity in just what it is we choose'to respect-the open­
ended text, the indeterminacy of governmental form, the vision of a changing 
future, and the general purpose to avoid tyrannical government, rather than a 
particular three-part model. 
Id. at 493. 
167. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). 
168. 	 Id. 
169. 	 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892). 
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Clause.I7o Both the Tariff Act in Field and the Vaccine Act in Ter­
ran authorize a member of the executive branch to effectively can­
cel an existing statute. l7l In the case of the Tariff Act, the executive 
branch member would be canceling a statute that implements the 
free importation of goods from certain countries.I72 Similarly, 
under the Vaccine Act, the executive branch member would be in 
effect canceling the Initial Injury Table by promUlgating the Re­
vised Injury Table. I73 These parallels may be the reason the major­
ity in Terran relied on the Field decision in its opinion. 
The difficulties with the Field decision are its age, having been 
decided 108 years ago, and that it did not involve the actual modifi­
cation of a statute that Terran did. Under the Vaccine Act, the Sec­
retary was authorized to' promulgate a Revised Injury Table, while 
under the Tariff Act, the President was authorized to declare a sus­
pensionY4 The difference is only a matter of the weight that can be 
given to a written regulation. Also, under the Tariff Act, the Presi­
dent was required to act upon certain conditions;I75 whereas, the 
Vaccine Act gives the Secretary discretion as to whether and when 
to revise the table. I76 Another distinction between the Tariff Act 
and the Vaccine Act is that the Tariff Act allowed the President to 
only temporarily suspend free importation of goods from certain 
countries. Under the Vaccine Act, however, the Secretary's promul­
gation of a Revised Injury Table effectively cancels the Initial Table 
for all subsequent petitions for relief. 
Under the reasoning in Field, it seems as though the Supreme 
Court of 1892 would have decided the issue in Terran the way the 
majority did. But, we are at a time when the Supreme Court has a 
wealth of knowledge and precedent at its disposal, some of which 
suggests that the decision in Terran would be decided differently if 
it were before the Court today. 
Several authors have criticized the reasoning in Clinton in a 
manner that lends credit to the Terran resultY7 One author argues 
170. Id. at 693. 
171. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1320-21 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
172. See Field, 143 U.S. at 680-94. 
173. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1320-21 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
174. Field, 143 U.S. at 680. 
175. Id. 
176. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1318 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
177. See, e.g., Thomas Charles Woodworth, Note, Meet the Presentment Clause: 
Clinton v. New York, 60 LA. L. REV. 349, 363 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court 
erred in its decision in Clinton because once the bill was signed into law and the Presi­
dent cancelled a provision under the Veto Act, the 'Presentment Clause no longer ap­
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that Clinton would have been decided differently under delegation 
of authority doctrines and that by deciding the case under the Pre­
sentment Clause, the Supreme Court effectively avoided the 
tougher question of inherent separation of powers.178 Another au­
thor points out that historically, the Supreme Court has given 
credence to delegation of authority from Congress to the President, 
but that in Clinton, the Court seemed to be caught up in the textual 
ramifications of the Veto Act.179 These authors' points are well 
taken, but the Court in Clinton reached an opposite result, a result 
that should have caused the Terran court to reconsider its 
reasoning. 
2. Delegation of Legislative Power and the Vaccine Act 
In Terran, the majority incorporated its functionalist view by 
concluding that the Vaccine Act's grant of authority to the Secre­
tary is a constitutionally permissible delegation of legislative 
power.180 Judge Clevenger noted that for a delegation of legislative 
power to be constitutionally legitimate, Congress must "lay down 
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform ...."181 
The statutory grant of power seems to leave Vaccine Act Injury 
Table revisions in the sole discretion of the Secretary,182 hardly 
what a court could find to be an "intelligible principle." Yet the 
majority found that the Vaccine Act constrains the Secretary's dis­
cretion by requiring that she consult with the Advisory Commission 
on Childhood Vaccines before proposing rules to revise the Injury 
Table. Therefore, Congress "clearly intended the Secretary to be 
guided by the findings from [the Commission's] studies when she 
decides to promulgate regulations to revise the injury table."183 
If Congress clearly intended the Secretary to be guided by the 
plied as it was only applicable to the procedure in which a bill becomes law); see also 
Eric Stephen Schmitt, Note, There is No Joy in D.C., the Mighty Court Struck Out: An 
Analysis of Clinton v. City of New York, The Line Item Veto Act and the Court's Failure 
to Uphold Constitutionally Legitimate Means to a Viable End, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 167, 
190 (2000) (stating that the Court's elevation of form over substance was a mistake as 
tolerance for government flexibility and innovation is a hallmark of democracy). 
178. Woodworth, supra note 177, at 353. 
179. Schmitt, supra note 177, at 186-88. 
180. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1315. 
181. Id. at 1315 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jf. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 
406 (1928)). 
182. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c) (1994). 
183. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1315 (noting that the Advisory Commission is comprised 
of health professionals, family members of those suffering vaccine-related injuries, and 
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Advisory Commission's findings, would it not have stated so in the 
statute? Section 300aa-14(c) only requires that the Secretary accept 
petitions for proposed regulations to amend the Injury Tab!e from 
the Commission, or any person.184 The petitions are referred to the 
Commission for their recommendation to the Secretary, but there 
are no standards to guide the Secretary as to what recommenda­
tions to accept; all the statute states is that "the Secretary shall con­
duct a rulemaking proceeding on the matters proposed . . . or 
publish ... reasons for not conducting such proceeding. "185 
Nothing in the statute requires the Secretary to follow a stan­
dard in determining what regulations to make.186 By the express 
words of the statute, the Secretary can either conduct a rule making 
proceeding or publish reasons for not doing so, with no guidelines 
regarding when to do either. This is hardly what has been deemed 
an "intelligible principle" in the past.187 Based on standards that 
have been deemed "intelligible principles" by the Supreme Court in 
the past, and on what seems to be a total lack of standards in the 
Vaccine Act, the Act does not pass as a constitutionally legitimate 
delegation of legislative power. 
3. The Vaccine Act Violates the Presentment Clause 
The decision in Clinton indicates that the Supreme Court may 
decide the issue in the Terran case differently than the Terran ma­
jority did, and may, in fact agree with the dissent.188 In Clinton, 
which is far more recent than the Field decision, the Court em­
braced the formalist approach and recognized that any legislative 
action must follow the explicit procedures set forth in the Present­
ment Clause of the Constitution.189 The Supreme Court deter­
mined that an Act authorizing action by the President to cancel 
discretionary spending items after a bill has become a law violates 
legal representatives who are charged with' the task of gathering information on vac­
cine-related injuries). 
184. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c) (1994). 
185. Id. 
186. See id. 
187. E.g., Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190225-26 (1943) (up­
holding delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast 
licensing as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" require); Fed. Power Comm'n v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600-03 (1944) (upholding delegation to the Fed­
eral Power Commission to determine "just and reasonable" rates). 
188. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1320 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
189. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998). 
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the Presentment Clause.190 The situation presented in Clinton re­
sembles that presented in Terran. In Clinton, Congress promul­
gated a legislative act that authorized a member of the executive 
branch to cancel certain portions of a statute,191 In Terran, Con­
gress promulgated a legislative act that authorized a member of the 
executive branch to create a regulation that effectively cancels cer­
tain portions of a statute.192 In this basic form, the two cases seem 
indistinguishable, but the opinions are in opposition. 
The Terran dissent incorporated the same reasoning and for­
malist feel as the Supreme Court's in Clinton.193 Congress, through 
section 300aa-14(c) of the Vaccine Act, bypassed the procedural re­
quirements of the Presentment Clause by authorizing the Secretary 
to promulgate the Revised Injury Table. This effectively repeals the 
Initial Injury Table, included in the statute, to all subsequent peti­
tions for relief.194 The Supreme Court in Clinton found that, 
through the Veto Act, Congress had bypassed the procedural re­
quirements of the Presentment Clause by authorizing the President 
to repeal portions of spending statutes.195 The dissent in Terran 
and the Supreme Court majority in Clinton concluded that, as acts 
by Congress that allow a member of the executive branch to do 
something that, in effect, repeals portions of existing statutes, both 
were unconstitutional violations of the Presentment Clause. 
Therefore, it seems that if the Supreme Court were to grant 
certiorari in a case that presents the same issue as Terran, it would 
conclude that the Vaccine Act unconstitutionally violated the Pre­
sentment Clause of the Constitution. The reason for this is two­
fold: (1) The Clinton case was decided recently, possibly showing 
the Court's present disposition; and (2) at their cores, the Clinton 
case and the Terran case are nearly identical and therefore the deci­
sions would, conceivably, be nearly identical. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court could recognize some 
defect in its reasoning in Clinton and implement the reasoning of 
the Field decision. This would lead to the same result as the Terran 
190. Id. at 449. 
191. Id. at 417 (stating that the Veto Act authorized the President to cancel cer­
tain discretionary spending provisions in statutes that he had already signed into law). 
192. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1308. The Vaccine Act authorizes the Secretary to pro­
mulgate a revised Injury Table that effectively makes the Initial Table ineffective to all 
petitions filed after the promulgation of the revised table. Id. 
193. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1317-21 (Plager, J., dissenting) (relying on the reasoning 
from Clinton and citing throughout). 
194. Id. at 1320 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
195. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449. 
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majority's decision in that the promulgation of the Revised Injury 
Table was held to be a legislatively required act that did not effec­
tively repeal an existing statute. Consequently, the Initial Injury 
Table would still be effective towards all petitions filed prior to the 
revision.196 
Realizing that the Supreme Court may not grant certiorari, the 
question becomes less what the Supreme Court would decide and 
more whether the Terran decision is correct and the Vaccine Act is 
in violation of the Presentment Clause in light of prior history and 
subjective opinions. 
The reasoning the Supreme Court set forth in Clinton seems 
logical but has been criticized by several authors.197 Despite this, 
the reasoning set forth by the majority in Terran seems to be based 
on a different interpretation of the Presentment Clause when com­
pared to that of the Supreme Court in the Clinton case. The Vac­
cine Act authorizes the Secretary to promulgate the Revised Injury 
Table that effectively repeals the Initial Injury Table (as the Initial 
Injury Table ceases to apply to subsequent petitions). Therefore, 
the Vaccine Act is no longer the same Act that was passed through 
both Houses of Congress and presented to the President. In effect, 
it is an altered Act containing an ineffective Initial Injury Table and 
a new Revised Injury Table that was not approved by either House 
of Congress or the President. One can only speculate as to whether 
the modified Vaccine Act would have become a law if it had been 
presented as a bill in its present form. Even if the Vaccine Act can 
be considered substantively the same as when it was initially 
promulgated, there is .still a policy argument against allowing the 
provision authorizing the Sec:t:etary's actions to stand. If we allow 
this type of legislation authorizing the executive branch to create 
new laws, we diminish the effect of the Constitution's system of 
checks and balances. 
The power to enact statutes may only "be exercised in accord 
with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered proce­
dure."198 The Framers of the Constitution placed great importance 
on the government being divided into the tripartite model, with 
each branch retaining powers exclusive and independent of the 
other branches as a way to limit power vested in one branch 
196. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312. 
197. See Woodworth, supra note 177, at 363; Schmitt, supra note 177, at 190. 
198. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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alone.199 After narrowly escaping the tyranny of England, the 
Framers clearly wanted to place carefully considered limits on each 
branch of the government, allowing no branch to dominate. 
The principles of separation of powers are fundamental to the 
success of the United States government, so allowing Congress to 
bypass the express words of our founding document facilitates a 
shift in power that the Framers of the Constitution sought to avoid. 
Congress erred in the promulgation of the Vaccine Act because it 
allows the Secretary to employ legislative power without employing 
an "intelligible principle," something a member of the executive 
branc!:t is forbidden from doing under the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The Terran case presents a new spin on a long debated topic in 
American jurisprudence. The Presentment Clause embodies in a 
single sentence the essence of the Constitution-the idea of separa­
tion of powers and a system of checks and balances. Violations of 
the Presentment Clause are necessarily avoided as they are in oppo­
sition to the very ideas that enabled the Framers to build a govern­
ment-free of tyranny-that would stand the test of time. Even 
though the Terran court found that the Vaccine Act did not violate 
the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, prior cases and careful 
legal analysis indicates that this decision may be decided differently 
in another court. Therefore, the Supreme Court may wish to recon­
sider whether or not to grant certiorari when this issue arises again. 
Congress may also wish to amend the Vaccine Act and set forth 
standards the Secretary must employ in making revisions to the In­
jury Table. Congress should strive to create standards that may be 
deemed "intelligible principles"2°O so that the Vaccine Act contains 
a constitutionally legitimate delegation of legislative power. Until 
such time, the Vaccine Act's grant of authority to the Secretary re­
mains unconstitutional with repercussions that not only threaten 
199. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). 
200. A standard that has been found to be an "intelligible principle" in the past 
and might fit the Vaccine Act situation requires the responsible agency to make regula­
tions as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding delegation to the Federal Com­
munications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as "public interest, conve­
nience, or necessity" requires). 
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our system of government, but also deprive sick children such as 
Julie Terran of compensation for their injuries. 
Erik Loftus 
